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Abstract
In view of the finding that debtors are likely to be more obese than non-
debtors, we investigate whether interpersonal differences in body mass are,
as in the case of debt behavior, related to those in time discounting and
time discounting anomalies. The effects of time discounting on body mass
index (BMI) and the probabilities of being obese, severely obese, and under-
weight are detected by incorporating three properties of intertemporal pref-
erences: (i) impatience, measured by the level of the respondents’ discount
rate; (ii) hyperbolic discounting, where discount rates for the discounting
of immediate future payoffs are higher than those of distant future payoffs;
and (iii) the sign effect, wherein future negative payoffs are discounted at
a lower rate than are future positive payoffs. We also find that body mass
is non-monotonically correlated with age, income, and working hours. As a
policy implication, body mass can potentially be controlled by changing the
intertemporal structure of medical care costs.
Keywords: BMI, obesity, underweight, time preference, discount rate, hy-
perbolic discounting, procrastination, the sign effect.
JEL classification: I10; Z00.
1 Introduction
As in the case of other advanced countries, the number of obese individuals
in Japan has been increasing, and this has been accompanied by associated
increases in social costs including health care costs. However, one distinct
feature in Japan is that in addition to obesity, underweight, too, is widely
observed. According to the National Survey of Health and Nutrition 2004
(hereafter, NSHN04), conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Wel-
fare of Japan, the prevalence rate of obesity in Japanese adults amounts
to nearly 30% for males and 20% for females. On the other hand, nearly
5% of male adults and 10% of female adults are underweight. In particu-
lar, the prevalence rate of underweight among females in their 20s exceeds
20%. Thus, it is important to examine the causes of these wide interpersonal
differences in body mass.
According to economic theory, optimal caloric intake is determined by the
condition that the present utility derived from marginal caloric intake netted
of its costs be equal to the discounted future marginal disutility derived
from being overweight (e.g., Cutler et al., 2003). The resulting body mass
would depend on consumers’ preferences regarding time discounting and risk
aversion, lifetime income, and the costs of caloric intake in terms of time and
money. Among other factors, people’s time preferences or discount rates have
been focused on as a key determinant of body mass and has been regarded as
important, especially in explaining the interpersonal differences in body mass
(e.g., Komlos et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005; and Borghans and Golsteyn,
2006).1 Those less patient, namely, those with higher time preferences, are
likely to discount more intensively the future disutility of obesity, and would
hence be more likely to be obese than those more patient, namely, those with
lower time preferences.
As suggested by the title of the paper, there is consistent evidence sug-
gesting that debtors are likely to be more obese than non-debtors. By using
data from a Japanese survey conducted in 2005 (the Japan Household Sur-
vey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction 2005, which is explained later),
Table 1 compares the body mass of debtors and non-debtors while excluding
housing loans from the debts. Body mass index (BMI), the standard measure
of body mass, is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters
squared (kg/m2). Both for the male and female samples, the table indicates
that debtors are significantly more obese than non-debtors (the definitions
1The cost factor is important, especially in explaining the dynamics of peoples’ body
mass. Cutler at al. (2003) and Chou et al. (2004) find that technological progress and the
resulting decrease in calorie prices could explain the recent rapid increases in the obesity
prevalence rate in the U.S.
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of obesity, etc., will be provided later). Because time discounting plays a
key role in determining debt holdings as a result of intertemporal resource
allocation, the significant correlation between body mass and debt holdings
suggests that time discounting may actually affect body mass formation.
Insert Table 1:
Debt holdings and body mass
By using Japanese survey data, this paper aims to examine the determi-
nants of interpersonal differences in body mass, especially focusing on the
empirical validity of the hypothesis that body mass is related to time dis-
counting. The novelty of our study lies in the fact that it investigates the
effects of not only impatience, measured by the level of respondents’ discount
rate, but also the effects of two time discounting anomalies that have been
empirically reported and predicted to affect debt holding behavior.2 One
time discounting anomaly is hyperbolic discounting or the immediacy effect,
under which a person discounts his/her immediate futures more intensively
than his/her distant futures (e.g., Thaler, 1981 and Benzion et al., 1989). Hy-
perbolic discounting causes consumers to procrastinate saving and thereby
hold excessive debts (e.g., Laibson, 1997, 1998). The other time discounting
anomaly is the sign effect, under which a person discounts positive payoffs
more intensively than negative payoffs. This anomaly makes consumers re-
luctant to pay interest in the future, thereby leading to “borrowing aversion”
behavior (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).
In view of the strong correlation between debt holdings and body mass,
as shown in Table 1, it would be plausible to apply the same logic of the
debt theory to body mass determination and hence to assume that the two
time discounting anomalies affect body mass. As Cutler et al. (2003) pre-
dict, hyperbolic discounting leads people to procrastinate controlling their
immediate appetite and to instead eat excessive cheap, fatty foods. The sign
effect leads people to try and control caloric intake in order to avoid bearing
the future psychological and/or monetary costs of obesity, such as the hard-
ships of dieting, costs of having to buy new larger sized clothes, and medical
services. We hypothesize that, as in the case of debt holdings, body mass is
related positively to the degrees of impatience and hyperbolic discounting,
and negatively to the sign effect. Our main interest involves investigating
the empirical validity of this hypothesis.
2For a comprehensive survey on time discounting anomalies, see, for example, Frederick,
et al. (2002).
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The relationships between body mass and time preference have been em-
pirically examined in the literature. By using international cross-sectional
macro data, Komlos et al. (2004) find that the prevalence rate of obesity in
theWestern advanced countries is negatively correlated with the national sav-
ings rate as a reverse proxy for national time preference. Using cross-sectional
data from a National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) conducted in the
U.S., Smith et al. (2005) report a significant negative correlation between
BMI and savings, which they used as a reverse proxy for time preference.
From Dutch survey data, Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) construct a vari-
ety of proxies for time discounting to show that the respondents’ BMI is
positively correlated with the time preference proxies. However, the proxies
for time preference used in these studies are not very refined. For example,
savings may well depend on variables other than time preference, such as in-
come, age, and especially the magnitudes of the time discounting anomalies.
For savings to be an accurate proxy for time preference, the effects of the
other determinants should be controlled for.
To eliminate this problem, we construct two kinds of time preference data.
First, by administering questionnaires on intertemporal monetary choices
under alternative conditions, we obtain individuals’ discount rates. This
enables us (i) to construct time preference data as a measure of impatience
by computing the normalized mean of the elicited discount rates, and (ii) to
construct indicator variables for hyperbolic discounting and the sign effect.
Second, we construct a time preference proxy from the debt holding data.
This proxy is estimated to be the residual after regressing debt holdings on
the degree of procrastination, the sign effect, income, and the determinants
other than time preference.
After controlling for demographic and economic factors, the main results
reveal that the time discounting anomalies as well as impatience jointly pre-
dict respondents’ body mass index and their probabilities of being obese
and underweight; moreover, the significance levels are higher for the female
sample than for the male sample.
Further, body mass is non-monotonically correlated with age, per capita
household income, and working hours. For example, BMI is found to be
quadratic in per capita income with a positive coefficient on the income
squared. One important implication of this is that an increase in income
inequality leads to an increase in the social mean of BMI. We will discuss
the implications of these findings for the recent BMI dynamics in Japan.
Definitions of obesity, severe obesity, and underweight
Different from the international criterion for obesity provided by the
World Health Organization (WHO), according to which a person is regarded
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as obese if he/she has a BMI ≥ 30, the Examination Committee of Criteria
for “Obesity Disease in Japan” (2002), affiliated to the Japan Society for
the Study of Obesity (JSSO), provided a new criterion specific to Japan,
according to which a person is regarded as obese if he/she has a BMI ≥
25; detailed differences between the two criteria are summarized in Table
2. The new criterion was provided based on scientific evidence such as the
finding that the average number of obesity-related disorders including hyper-
glycemia, dylipidemia, and hypertension exceeds 1.0 at a BMI of 25 and that
there is a progressive increase in such disorders at a BMI ≥ 25 (see “New
Criteria,” 2002). Since then, academic research, especially medical research,
on the health of the Japanese as well as on the medical care policy of the
Japanese government has been conducted based on the JSSO criterion.
In the text that follows, based on the JSSO criterion, we define obesity
as a condition wherein a person has a BMI ≥ 25 and severe obesity as a con-
dition wherein a person has a BMI ≥ 30 (see Table 2). Similarly, individuals
with a BMI < 18.5 are classified as underweight. A BMI of 22, at which
the probability of diseases becomes minimal (see “New Criteria,” 2002), is
regarded as standard or ideal.
Insert Table 2:
Definitions of obesity and underweight
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the rela-
tion between time discounting and caloric intake is discussed from the view-
point of intertemporal resource allocation. In Section 3, after our Japanese
survey data are presented, the time discounting data including discount rates
and indicators for time discounting anomalies are constructed. Section 4
shows the regression results. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion.
2 Time discounting and caloric intake behav-
ior
When we make intertemporal decisions including those on caloric intake, our
subjective discount rate, a measure of time preference, plays a key role in
determining how much of a resource is consumed for present gratification and
how much is saved for future gratification. We hypothesize that interpersonal
differences in BMI are, in part, related to those in time discounting. To
investigate the effects of time discounting on BMI and hence on the degrees
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of obesity and underweight, we take into account three properties regarding
time discounting: (i) the degree of impatience, (ii) hyperbolic discounting,
and (iii) the sign effect.
(i) Impatience
A higher subjective discount rate implies a higher degree of impatience
and hence a stronger preference for present consumption. In advanced coun-
tries, where the costs of caloric intake in terms of both money and time are
so low that nutrition and calories that are biologically required for subsis-
tence are almost freely available, those less patient with higher discount rates
would tend to have higher BMI values and to have a higher probability of
being obese. As in Komlos et al. (2004) and Smith et al. (2005), we hy-
pothesize that persons with higher discount rates tend to have greater body
mass.
(ii) Hyperbolic discounting
As a stylized fact, it has often been reported that people have high dis-
count rates for very short delays whereas they have considerably lower dis-
count rates for longer delays (e.g., Thaler, 1981 and Benzion et al., 1989).
This implies that people are less patient in the case of immediate gratifica-
tion than in the case of delayed gratifications in the distant future. Since
the resulting discount factor is better described by a hyperbolic function of
delay than an exponential one, the phenomenon is referred to as hyperbolic
discounting.3
Hyperbolic discounting tends to lead people lacking adequate self-control
to engage in time-inconsistent procrastination with regard to dieting and
health care and consequently to overeating, which will harm their long-run
interests (e.g., Ainslie, 2001). In theory, Cutler et al. (2003) stress that reduc-
tions in costs pertaining to food consumption due to recent technological ad-
vancements have been accelerating this time-inconsistent overeating, thereby
increasing the prevalence rate of obesity. Chapman (1995) also points out
that hyperbolic discounting gives rise to underinvestment in health capital.
We hypothesize that persons with a stronger tendency toward hyperbolic dis-
counting and hence with a stronger propensity toward procrastination tend
to have a greater body mass.
(iii) The sign effect
3This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the immediacy effect (e.g., Thaler, 1981;
Benzion et al., 1989).
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Many studies have reported that losses are discounted at a lower rate than
are gains. For example, Thaler (1981) finds that the discount rates for gains
were 3 to 10 times higher than those for losses. Several of Thaler’s subjects
evidence negative discount rates for loss, implying that an immediate loss
is preferred to a delayed loss of the same value. In Loewenstein (1988), his
subjects’ evaluations reveal that they are indifferent between receiving $100
immediately and receiving $157 in a year and are indifferent between losing
$100 immediately and losing $133 in a year. This gain-loss asymmetry is
referred to as the sign effect.
The sign effect makes people reluctant to borrow because persons who
operate under this effect require a more favorable (i.e., lower) interest rate
to borrow than they would to save (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).
Similarly, in the case of the sign effect, people tend to try to control food
consumption to avoid bearing various obesity-related costs in the future,
such as the hardships associated with dieting and costs of medical care. We
hypothesize that subjects operating under the sign effect are likely to have a
smaller body mass.
3 The data
Our empirical research is based on the Japan Household Survey on Consumer
Preferences and Satisfaction 2005 (hereafter, JHS05), conducted in February
2005. This survey is a project that is carried out as part of the Osaka
University COE program, sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, and Science and Technology of Japan. The JHS05 is a household
survey, in which 6000 randomly selected Japanese respondents who are older
than the age of 20 are requested to fill out questionnaires; out of the 6000
people, 2987 responded, and the proportion of male respondents was 47.0 %,
with the average age of the respondents being 49.080. The survey contains
various questions that enable us to elicit information about the respondents’
attitudes toward time discounting and risk; their demographic, social, and
economic attributes; and their health status including height and weight.
3.1 BMI
From the data on height and weight obtained from the JHS05, the respon-
dents’ BMI values are calculated by dividing weight in kilograms by height
in meters squared. Since the JHS05 elicited self-reported data, the resulting
BMI data may well contain an underreporting bias due to respondents’ un-
derreporting of weight and overreporting of height, as in Cawley (2004) and
6
Chou et al. (2004). Every year, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
of Japan measures the actual height and weight of thousands of randomly se-
lected Japanese people and summarizes the data obtained from the survey by
reporting the BMI distributions, by age, of the males and females. Since the
sample sizes of the NSHN04 and JHS05 are sufficiently large, by comparing
the age-based BMI distributions of our JHS05 data with those of the NSHN
conducted in 2004 (hereafter, NSHN04; sample size: 7689), we could roughly
examine whether or not the JHS05 data contain a self-reporting bias.4 If the
presence of a bias is strongly suggested, it would be necessary to correct for
it.
Figures 1(a) and (b) compare the BMI distributions obtained from the
NSHN04 and JHS05 for the male (a) and female (b) samples; the histograms
represent differences in relative frequencies (the “corrected data” will be
demonstrated later). As seen from the figures, the JHS05 distribution is
thicker than the NSHN04 distribution in the normal range (18.5 5 BMI
< 25), whereas for the ranges of underweight and, especially obesity, the
JHS05 displays thinner tails than the NSHN04; all these observations sug-
gest the possibilities of the presence of a self-reporting bias in the JHS04
data.
Insert Figures 1(a) and 1(b):
BMI distributions: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data.
Tables 3(a) through (d) statistically describe and compare the distribu-
tions, by age, of BMI and the prevalence rates of obesity, severe obesity, and
underweight as revealed by the NSHN04 and JHS05 data sets, respectively.
From this data, we can observe three tendencies. First of all, consistent with
Figures 1 (a) and (b), the BMI mean, the obesity rate, and the severe obe-
sity rate seem to reflect an underreporting bias. Particularly in the case of
the data for females, the BMI means and the obesity rate as revealed by
the JHS05 are significantly lower in many generations than those as revealed
by the NSHN04 data. Consistent with this tendency, the sample standard
deviations (SDs) of the females’ BMI in the JHS05 are significantly smaller
than those in the NSHN04. As for the male sample, although the bias is
not as large as it is in the female sample, the obesity rates are smaller in
the JHS05. Second, there is no difference between the rates of severe obesity
4The NSHN04 survey was conducted in November 2004, and the JHS05 survey was
conducted in February 2005; therefore, the systematic differences in the two BMI data
sets due to time difference can be regarded as negligible.
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among males in the two data sets. Third, although the prevalence rates of
underweight in the JHS05 are slightly lower than those in the NSHN04, their
downward bias does not seem to be substantial.
Insert Tables 3 (a) through (d):
By-age distributions of body mass: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data
Based on these observations, we correct for the underreporting bias in
the female sample by employing the following procedure, which is a modified
version of the procedure proposed in the literature (e.g., Cawley, 2004; Chou
et al., 2004; Cawley and Burkhauser, 2006; and Michaud et al., 2007).5 From
the self-reported BMI data in generations i (i = 20, 30, 40, 50, 60) obtained
from the JHS05, we specify a quadratic function, fi (x) = aix2 + bix + ci
for x = 22, to obtain corrected BMI data. The coefficients ai, bi, and ci are
determined such that the function satisfies
(1) fi (x∗i ) = 25;
(2) fi (x∗∗i ) = 30; and
(3) fi (22) = 22,
where x∗i and x
∗∗
i represent the critical BMI values by which to define obesity
and severe obesity for generation i that equilibrate the prevalence rates of
obesity and severe obesity in JHS05 to the corresponding prevalence rates in
the NSHN04. For the sample of females in their 50s, x∗50 is obtained as 24.24,
which means that for the female obesity rate in the JHS05 data to equal that
in the NSHN04 data, the critical BMI value that defines obesity should be
lowered from 25 to 24.24. The adjusted critical BMI x∗∗50 for severe obesity
amounts to 28.67.
Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that the corrected BMI distribution gen-
erates the same obesity and severe obesity rates as those in the NSHN04.
5Chou et al. (2004) followed Cawley’s (2004) procedure when correcting for the under-
reporting biases in the original self-reported data by (1) estimating the quadratic relations
between actual and self-reported values of weight and height by using the Third National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), U.S.A., and (2) applying the
estimated relations to their American self-reported data (the BRFSS) pertaining to weight
and height to obtain bias-corrected data and to compute bias-corrected BMI. Michaud et
al. (2007) applied the quadratic correction function estimated by Cawley and Burkhauser
(2006) to their European self-reported data. In Japan, there is no data set that contains
both actually measured and self-reported data of height and weight. However, it might
be questionable to directly apply Cawley and Burkhauser’s estimated correction function
to the Japanese data because the BMI distribution in Japan and the definition of obesity
therein both differ from those in the American or European countries (see the Examination
Committee, 2002).
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Condition (3) is the assumption that since a BMI of 22 is thought of as
the healthiest from the medical viewpoint,6 people with BMI 5 22 could
be regarded as having no incentive to underreport their weights and/or to
overreport their height, and hence, would have no tendency to underreport
their BMI values. The corrected values of the female BMI for x = 22 are
computed by using the quadratic functions obtained for the corresponding
generations, whereas for x < 22, no adjustment is made since no serious bias
is observed for the range of small BMI values.
The male BMI data are adjusted in a similar manner except that no
adjustment is made for x > 30 since, as seen from Table 3(c), the prevalence
rate of severe obesity in the JHS05 does not differ significantly from that in
the NSHN04. There seems to be no strong incentive for severely obese males
to underreport their BMI.
The body mass distributions of the corrected data are depicted in Fig-
ures 1(a) and (b) and are summarized statistically in Tables 3(a) through
(d). They show that the correction eliminates, to a great extent, the under-
reporting bias. By construction, the biases in the prevalence rates of obesity
for males and females as well as those in the prevalence rate of severe obesity
for females are almost completely corrected for. The differences between the
BMI mean revealed by the corrected JHS05 and that revealed by the NSHN04
are statistically insignificant for almost all the generations. The downward
biases in the standard deviation of BMI are also reasonably reduced.7 8
3.2 Eliciting discount rates
In the JHS05, the respondents’ discount rates are measured by asking five
questions on intertemporal choice under alternative conditions. As in previ-
ous surveys (e.g., Harrison et al., 2002 and Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006),
the respondents are told to choose between two options, “A” and “B.” For
example, they are asked to choose between “A”–receiving JPY 10,000 in 2
days and “B”–receiving JPY 10,000 plus a certain amount JPY α, say JPY
10,038, in 9 days. Here, choosing the delayed receipt “B” instead of “A”
implies receiving 20% of the annual interest rate. In each question, eight
such queries with alternative α values, from small to large, and hence with
alternative imputed interest rates, from low to high, were asked in rows of a
6See Examination Committee of JSSO (2002).
7However, the corrections of the downward bias in the SDs remain insufficient for males
in their 20s and 30s and for females in their 30s and 40s.
8The main empirical results that are reported in Section 4 do not differ substantially
even when the uncorrected BMI data are used when conducting the regression analysis
below. For the empirical results in the case of the uncorrected data, see the Appendix.
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question table.
Table 4 represents the query QUESTION 1, wherein the amount of re-
ceipt for option “A” is specified as JPY 10,000 and the imputed interest rate
for option “B” changes from —10% to 300%. The respondents are expected to
choose option “A” at low interest rates, whereas as the imputed interest rate
rises, they are expected to switch to option “B” at a certain critical high rate.
The individual respondents’ discount rates can be inferred by estimating the
interest rate at which the delayed receipt of option “B” is indifferent to the
more immediate receipt of option “A.” Note, however, that the elicited dis-
count rates are associated with the particular choice conditions, for example,
2 days versus 9 days, the amount JPY 10,000 for option “A” in QUESTION
1.
Insert Table 4:
Question to elicit discount rates: An example (QUESTION 1 for DR1)
To detect time discounting anomalies, five questions are developed by
controlling for (i) money amounts for option “A” as JPY 10,000 or JPY 1
million; (ii) time horizons for “A” as 2 days, 1 month, or 90 days; (iii) time
delays as 7 days or 12 months; and (iv) receipt or payment. In the “payment”
question, QUESTION 5, the respondents are asked to choose either “A” —
paying JPY 1 million in 1 month or “B” — paying JPY 1 million + some
amount in 13 months, from which acceptable interest rate payments to delay
a 1 million payment for 12 months are elicited.
From each question, we obtain raw response data, which indicate the
interest rates between which each respondent switched his/her choice from
option “A” to “B.” Some subjects, however, stuck to option “A,” regardless
of the interest rates that were offered. To elicit the respondents’ discount
rates from these raw data, we follow Kimball et al. (2005) in estimating a
log-normal distribution for the cross-respondent distribution of gross discount
rates. From the estimated distribution, each respondent’s gross discount rate
for a certain question, that is, a certain question table, is estimated as an
expected value conditional on the fact that the respondent changes his/her
choice between certain interest rates. The descriptive statistics of the elicited
discount rates, together with the choice conditions under which they are
elicited, are summarized in Table 5, where DRi (i = 1, . . . , 5) represent the
discount rates that are estimated from QUESTION i.
Insert Table 5:
Elicited discount rates under alternative choice conditions
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To investigate the effect of impatience on bodymass, we construct DRSTD,
which represents the simple average of the standardized values of the elicited
discount rates DRi (i = 1, . . . , 5):
DRSTD = (1/5)Σ5i=1(DRi −E((DRi))/σ(DRi), (1)
where E(·) and σ(·) represent sample means and standard deviations. For
E(DRi) and σ(DRi), see Table 5. Table 6 summarizes the definitions of
variables that are used in the analysis below as well as their basic statistics.9
It is hypothesized that, other things being equal, the respondents’ body mass
depends positively on the impatience index DRSTD.
Insert Table 6:
Definitions of variables and basic statistics
3.2.1 Time discounting anomalies
By comparing the mean values of the elicited discount rates, we can examine
whether our average respondent displays the aforementioned two anomalies of
time discounting. First, on average, hyperbolic discounting or the immediacy
effect is not observed since the mean of the discount rate DR1, imputed from
the immediate future choice (i.e., 2 days or 9 days), is not significantly higher
than DR2, which is applied to a more distant future choice (i.e., 90 days or 97
days). Second, the discount rate DR4 applied to future receipts is significantly
higher than DR5, the DR used for the discounting of future payments; this
implies that our average respondent displays the sign effect.10
To examine the effects of the time discounting anomalies on the respon-
dents’ body mass, we construct the binary indicator HYPERBOL for hyper-
bolic discounting, and the binary indicator SIGN for the sign effect, where,
for example, HYPERBOL = 1 if DR1 > DR2, and HYPERBOL = 0 oth-
erwise. From the mean values of HYPERBOL and SIGN, shown in Table
6, the proportions of the respondents who display the anomalies are 61.1%
(hyperbolic discounting) and 88.5% (the sign effect). Our hypothesis is that,
9Although the standardized average DRSTD of the elicited discount rates should the-
oretically satisfy E(DRSTD) = 0 and σ(DRSTD) = 1, neither of the equalities is fulfilled,
as seen in Table 6. This stems from the fact that the number of effective responses differ
in the five discount rate questions.
10In addition, although we have not included the results of the t test in Table 5, DR3, the
discount rate for JPY 10,000 is significantly higher than DR4, applied for JPY 1 million,
implying that people are more patient in the case of larger amounts than in the case of
smaller amounts. This tendency is called the magnitude effect (e.g., Benzion et al., 1989
and Frederick et al., 2002).
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other things being equal, the respondents’ body mass is positively related to
HYPERBOL and negatively related to SIGN.
3.2.2 Proxies for impatience and procrastination
To capture the effects of impatience and hyperbolic discounting, we also con-
struct proxy variable DEBTIMP for impatience and PROCR for hyperbolic
discounting. To measure respondents’ degrees of hyperbolic discounting or
procrastination, the JHS05 survey asks them to indicate, on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 to 5, what used to be the extent of their tendency to procras-
tinate doing homework assignments in the summer vacations during their
high school days.11 Variable PROCR represents the response data to this
question, wherein a larger value implies a stronger tendency toward procras-
tination or hyperbolic discounting.
Besides DRSTD, we estimate DEBTIMP, as a proxy measure of the de-
gree of impatience, from the respondents’ debt holding behavior. In the
JHS05, the respondents are asked to indicate whether they have debts other
than housing loans. Let DEBT denote a binary indicator for the debt hold-
ing. The debt holding DEBT is expected to depend on time discounting in
three ways: by means of (i) impatience, where high impatience implies a high
probability of debt holdings; (ii) hyperbolic discounting, which causes people
to procrastinate carrying out saving plans, leading to excessive debt holdings
(see Laibson, 1997, 1998); and (iii) the sign effect, which makes people re-
luctant to pay interest in the future, thereby inducing “borrowing aversion”
behavior (see Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).
Impatience proxy DEBTIMP is the standardized residual of Prob(DEBT
= 1) after regressing it using a probit model on the following: PROCR, as a
proxy for (ii); SIGN, the binary indicator for (iii); and other control variables
capturing the degree of risk aversion (RISKAV), per capita household income
(INCOME and INCOME^2), the expected percentage change of income in a
forthcoming year (∆INCOME), and ages (AGE and AGE squared). The risk
aversion index RISKAV is constructed by subtracting from 100% the respon-
dents’ responses to the question “When you go out, how high a probability
of rainfall makes you carry an umbrella?” A high RISKAV value, say that
of 90%, implies that the respondent carries an umbrella even when it is very
unlikely to rain, say if there is a 10% probability of rainfall.
The result of the first stage probit regression for Prob(DEBT = 1), to-
gether with that of the regression with impatience measure DRSTD added
11In Japanese elementary and high schools, students are usually given many different
homework assignments during the summer vacations.
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to the set of the explanatory variables, are shown in Table 7, where the mar-
ginal effect of each explanatory variable on the probability of the respondent
being a debtor is listed. As shown in the second column, which depicts the
first probit model without DRSTD as a regressor, the coefficients for all the
explanatory variables are significant. In particular, as predicted by theory,
debt holding is positively related to the tendency to procrastinate PROCR,
and negatively related to the sign effect SIGN, where both the coefficients are
significant at the 10% level.12 As seen in the third row of the table, the result
is robust, except that the P-value for PROCR becomes a little lower than
10% when we introduce, as an impatience measure, the standardized mean
of the elicited discount rates DRSTD to the set of explanatory variables.
Insert Table 7:
Time discounting and debt holdings
The proxy DEBTIMP for impatience is constructed by standardizing the
residuals of the first regression model, that is, the model that does not
include the impatience variable as a regressor. To check the relevancy of
using DEBTIMP as an impatience proxy, Table 8 examines correlations
of DEBTIMP with the discount rates elicited from each respondent and
DRSTD. In fact, the impatience proxy shows significant positive correlations
with each of the respondent’s discount rates and DRSTD. This is consistent
with the fact that, as is seen in the third column of Table 7, the impatience
measure DRSTD has a positive and highly significant correlation with debt
holdings.
Insert Table 8:
Correlations between impatience proxy (DEBTIMP) and elicited discount
rates
4 Results
For explanatory variables of the respondents’ body mass, we take into ac-
count (i) preference factors regarding time discounting and risk aversion; (ii)
demographic factors, including gender (MALE), education (UNIV), and age
12Negative coefficients of risk aversion RISKAV could be interpreted as capturing the
tendency that the more risk averse hold smaller debts to avoid the risk of bankruptcy.
Debt holding is shown to be quadratically correlated with age and income.
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(AGE), where MALE and UNIV are binary indicators for males and uni-
versity graduates, respectively; and (iii) economic factors such as per capita
household income INCOME and working hours (WORKHOUR). Since there
is uncertainty regarding how much increase in BMI is caused by a certain
amount of excessive caloric intake, we hypothesize that more risk-averse re-
spondents are likely to have a smaller BMI value.
To capture possible non-monotonic correlations, we add AGE squared,
INCOME squared, and the square root of WORKHOUR to the set of ex-
planatory variables. As for working hours, Ohtake (2005) conjectured that
people’s BMI is correlated with their working hours under two circumstances.
The first circumstance is that of overworking. Working for long hours is
bound to lead to irregular and unhealthy eating–for example, skipping
breakfast, eating dinner late, and eating out frequently–which causes obe-
sity. Second, especially in the case of women who work part-time jobs, work-
ing hours function as a means to control caloric intake. With these positive
and negative effects of increases in working hours, BMI may have a non-
monotonic correlation with working hours. The empirical validity of this
assumption is examined by including WORKHOUR and its square root as
explanatory variables.13
We also control for smoking habits SMOKING, which indicates the strength
of the respondents’ smoking habit on a 6-point scale. Since smoking harms
one’s health and thereby reduces body mass, BMI is expected to be neg-
atively correlated with SMOKING. Note that, as is often stressed in the
literature (Becker and Murphy, 1988 and Khwaja et al., 2007), less patient
people are likely to smoke more since the future loss in utility caused by
the unhealthy behavior is likely to be discounted more intensively. Unless
the smoking habit is controlled for, the correlation between BMI and time
discounting might be underestimated.
We estimate two regression models: model (1) and model (2). In model
(1), we use time discounting variables elicited from hypothetical intertem-
poral monetary choices, namely, DRSTD, as an impatience measure, and
HYPERBOL as a measure for hyperbolic discounting (or procrastination).
Due to a domain effect, however, these time discounting variables constructed
from hypothetical monetary choices might not succeed in capturing the cor-
relation between time discounting and BMI.14 Thus, instead, model (2) re-
13By examining Japanese cross-sectional data in 2000, Suzuki (2007) reported that both
the BMI and the probability of being obese are positively and significantly correlated with
working hours, thereby partially supporting Ohtake’s conjecture.
14For example, Chapman (1995) report that monetary discount rates do not have a
strong explanatory power for intertemporal choices regarding health investments. In fact,
in Borghans et al. (2006), monetary discount rates elicited from hypothetical pecuniary
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gresses body mass variables including BMI on the proxies for time discount-
ing, namely, DEBTIMP for impatience and PROCR for hyperbolic discount-
ing (procrastination). Other explanatory variables, including the indicator
SIGN for the sign effect, are common to the two models. The models are
estimated in the all, male, and female samples in order. The OLS method is
used for the BMI regression and the binary probit method is used to estimate
the probabilities of being obese, severely obese, and underweight.
4.1 BMI
4.1.1 Preference factors
Table 9 summarizes the results of the OLS regressions for BMI. In model (1),
as is predicted by theory, BMI displays significantly positive correlations with
impatience (DRSTD) for the full sample and significantly negative correla-
tions with the sign effect (SIGN) for the full sample and the female sample.
In the full sample, for example, a discount rate that exceeds the average by
one unit of SD, ceteris paribus, leads to a BMI that is around .300 higher than
the average. In this sample, the BMI of the average respondent who displays
the sign effect is around .578 smaller than that of respondents who do not
display the sign effect. However, positive effects of hyperbolic discounting
HYPERBOL are not significant in model (1). As a whole, the effects of time
discounting on BMI are not strongly detected from model (1).
Insert Table 9:
BMI regressions
In model (2), in contrast, BMI displays fairly significant correlations with
the three time discounting variables. In particular, for the full and female
samples, the coefficients of all the time discounting variables, namely, impa-
tience (DEBTIMP), procrastination (PROCR), and the sign effect (SIGN),
have expected signs and are fairly significant. Also, in the male sample, the
positive effect of procrastination is significant.
To quantitatively evaluate the impacts of the time discounting variables
reported in Table 9, Table 10 computes the normalized impacts by dividing
the marginal effects in model (2) by the sample mean or the SD of BMI.
The column “∆impatience” reports the impacts of an increase in the average
of the discount rates DRi by one unit of the SD, that is, a unit increase
choices do not display as strong correlations with BMI as do other impatience proxies that
are constructed from responses to behavioral and/or psychological questions.
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in DRSTD; the column “∆procrastination” shows the effects of an increase
in the propensity to procrastinate doing homework from the weakest degree
(PROCR= 1) to the strongest degree (PROCR= 5); and the column “∆sign
effect” represents the effects of the presence of the sign effect (SIGN = 1),
compared to the case without the sign effect (PROCR = 0). As seen from
the table, procrastination and the sign effect have certain impacts on the fe-
males’ BMI. Female respondents with the strongest degree of procrastination
are, ceteris paribus, heavier than those with the weakest degree of procras-
tination by 33.78% of the sample SD. The difference in BMI between female
respondents who do and do not display the sign effect amounts to -23.58%
of the sample SD. Relative to these impacts, those of impatience on BMI are
not so large, though.
Insert Table 10:
Impacts of time discounting variables on BMI: The case of Model (2)
In sum, both the models show that, especially for the full and female sam-
ples, BMI shows expected correlations with impatience and the sign effect.
A significant positive correlation between BMI and hyperbolic discounting
is also consistently observed in all the samples when the tendency to pro-
crastinate doing homework is used as a proxy for the degree of hyperbolic
discounting.
The dependence of BMI on risk aversion (RISKAV) is, as is expected,
significantly negative for the full and male samples in both models. For
example, the BMI of a male respondent who is risk averse such that his
critical likelihood of carrying an umbrella is 10% higher than the average
is, ceteris paribus, lower than that of the average male by .100 (model (1))
to .103 (model (2)). For the female sample, however, the observed negative
correlations between BMI and RISKAV are insignificant.
4.1.2 Demographic factors
With regard to demographic variables, males are significantly heavier than
females, which is in contrast to the case in the American and European
countries.15 In both models and for both samples, BMI quadratically depends
15By using the U.S. samples, Komlos et al. (2004) show that the average BMI of and
the obesity rate among females are larger than those of males. Borghans and Golsteyn
(2006) detect the same tendency in the Dutch samples. By using the U.S. survey data,
Chou et al. (2004) report that males’ BMI is larger than that of females, whereas the
obesity rate among females is higher than that among males.
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significantly on age, such that BMI increases with age at decreasing rates
until a critical age, after which it decreases at increasing rates. The critical
peak is 53.25 (i.e., 0.213/(2*0.002)) years (model (1)) or 52.00 (model (2))
for males, and 64.00 years (model (1)) or 65.75 (model (2)) for females.16As
seen in Table 3(a), if the other explanatory variables are not controlled for,
males’ BMI peaks when they are in their 40s, which is earlier than the age at
which they are at their heaviest (i.e., 53.25 years (model (1)) or 52.00 (model
(2)); on the other hand, females’ BMI peaks when they are in their 60s, which
is consistent with the estimate given by the multivariate regression. A high
level of education (UNIV) is not found to have a significant correlation with
BMI.
4.1.3 Economic factors
In the full and female samples, the coefficients of per capita household in-
come (INCOME) are significantly negative and those of the income squared
are significantly positive in both models, which implies that the BMI-income
correlation could be non-monotonic. In fact, in both samples, the critical
income level at which BMI reaches its lowest level is higher than the average
income level, but still remains within the observed income range. For exam-
ple, Figures 2(a) and (b) depict the relations in the female sample between
per capita household income and BMI, estimated by models (1) and (2),
respectively, when the effects of other factors considered in the models are
controlled for. The critical income level estimated from the female sample
regression is 3.785 (i.e., JPY .598/(.079*2)) million for model (1). Since the
SD in the female sample is estimated as 1.503, the critical income exceeds
the mean income by an SD of 1.094. For model (2), the critical income level
at which the female BMI reaches its lowest level is estimated as JPY 3.912
million, which exceeds the mean income by an SD of 1.178.
Figure 3 depicts the resulting non-monotonic relation between the female
respondents’ income and the income elasticity of BMI, where the females’
income elasticity of BMI in each income quintile, evaluated at its average
income and average BMI, is plotted.17 In both models (1) and (2), it is
shown that the female respondents in the highest income quintile show pos-
16For the full sample, BMI peaks at an age of 61.00 years in model (1) and at an age of
60.00 years in model (2); these ages are slightly higher than 57, which Chou et al. (2004)
obtained by using U.S. data.
17Letting β1 and β2 denote the estimated coefficients of INCOME and INCOME^2,
the income elasticities of BMI evaluated at the average in the i th income quintiles
(i = 1, · · · , 5) are given by Ei(INCOME)(β1 + 2β2Ei(INCOME))/Ei(BMI), where Ei(·)
represent averages in the i th income quintiles.
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itive income elasticities of BMI (i.e., 2.8% and 2.7% for models (1) and (2),
respectively), whereas those in the lower income classes show negative income
elasticities.18 The non-monotonic income-BMI relation is in contrast with the
monotonic, negative correlations between income and BMI that have been
reported in the literature.19
Insert Figures 2(a) and (b):
Income and BMI: Females (model (1) and (2), respectively)
Insert Figure 3:
Income Elasticities of BMI in Income Quintiles
It is noteworthy that, with the significant positive effect of per capita
household income squared, the sample mean of BMI depends positively on the
degree of income inequality measured by the sample variance of per capita in-
come. Because E(INCOME2) =
¡
N−1
N
¢
σ(INCOME)2+E(INCOME)2, where
N denotes the number of samples, the sample mean E(BMI) depends on
σ(INCOME)2. With a positive coefficient of INCOME2, a mean-preserving
increase in income variance is thus predicted to lead to an increase in the
sample mean of BMI. This relation might have an implication in explaining
the recent decline in BMI among females in Japan since there has been a
decrease in the income inequality of Japanese females.20 For example, based
on the results of the female sample regression of model (1), a decrease by 0.1
in the variation coefficient of per capita income σ(INCOME)/E(INCOME)
would decrease the females’ mean BMI by 0.054,21 which amounts to a 23.7%
18The females’ income elasticities of BMI, evaluated at their overall average, are com-
puted as —0.025 for model (1) and —0.031 for model (2), which are close to Chou et al.’s
(2004) estimate of —0.03 of the income elasticity of BMI in their full sample. In the case
of the full sample, however, our estimates become around —0.01 for both the models,
reflecting the tendency of the males’ BMI to be inelastic to income.
19Chou at al. (2004) also report that BMI is quadratically related to household income.
In their result, however, the critical income level is so high that BMI almost monotonically
decreases over the actual range of their income sample.
20Actually, from our JHS2004 and JHS2005 data, the variation coefficients of the fe-
males’ per capita household income are 0.793 in 2004 and 0.702 in 2005, implying that
there was a 0.047 decrease in the variation coefficient during the 2 years.
21The sample mean of BMI can be expressed in terms of variation coefficient v ≡
σ(INCOME)/E(INCOME) as
E(BMI) = const+ β
µ
N − 1
N
¶
E(INCOME)2
¡
v2 + 1
¢
+ · · · ,
where β denotes the coefficient of INCME^2 in the regression result; and N−1N ' 1 for our
sample size.
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decrease in females’ BMI from 2003 (average BMI (age ≥ 20): 22.62) to 2004
(22.39).22 In the case of model (2), the decrease in BMI predicted by a 0.1 de-
crease in σ(INCOME)/E(INCOME) equals 0.063, which amounts to 27.3%
of the actual BMI decrease during the 2003—04 period.23.
In Table 9, the respondents’ BMI values are also shown to have a non-
monotonic correlation with working hours in the full and female samples.
Consistent with what Ohtake (2005) conjectures, with positive coefficients
of WORKHOUR and negative coefficients of its square root, the correlation
is negative for small WORKHOUR values, whereas it becomes positive for
WORKHOUR values that are larger than some critical levels. Figure 4 de-
picts the resulting non-monotonic working hour elasticities of BMI, where the
critical working hour values at which the elasticity of BMI shifts from nega-
tive to positive are computed as 12.84 hours a week for model (1) and 12.38
hours a week for model (2). Although the working hour-BMI correlation
is insignificant in the male sample, the significant non-monotonic correlation
between working hours and BMI persists in the full sample, where the critical
working hour values are 11.21 for model (1) and 11.65 for model (2).
Insert Figure 4:
Females’ working hour elasticities of BMI
4.2 Obesity and severe obesity
Let OBESITY and SEVERE OBESITY be binary indicators for obesity and
severe obesity, respectively. By using binary probit models, we estimate
the marginal effects on the probabilities Prob (OBESITY = 1) and Prob
(SEVERE OBESITY = 1) of the same explanatory variables for BMI as in
models (1) and (2). Tables 11 and 12 show the results for obesity and serious
obesity, respectively.
As for obesity, the estimated marginal effects of the impatience variables
DRSTD and DEBTIMP are both positive and reasonably significant in both
models. In the full sample, the respondents who are less patient by an SD of
one unit than the average are obese with a 5.8% higher probability in model
(1) and with a 2.8% higher probability in model (2). Note that these impacts
22For the Japanese BMI distribution in 2003, see the NSHN03.
23However, since a magnitude of 0.1 is unusually large as an increase in the variation
coefficient of income, the effect of income inequality seems quantitatively too small to
explain the recent decrease in the body mass of females. In fact, during the 2003—04
period, a 0.047 decrease in the variation coefficient of income is observed in the JHS data,
which can explain only 7.4% (model 1) to 8.5% (model 2) of the decrease (0.23) in the
females’ BMI reported by the NSHN during the 2 years.
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are not that small compared with the overall obesity prevalence rate (24.3%),
that is, the unconditional probability of being obese.
With regard to the other discounting variables, the result of model (1)
is poor, whereas in model (2), the effect of procrastination (PROCR) on
the obesity probability is positive at the 1% significance level in the full
and female samples. In model (2), the probability of respondents with the
strongest tendency to procrastinate (PROCR = 5) being obese is roughly
10.8% (2.7% times 4) higher than the corresponding probability of those
with no tendency to procrastinate (PROCR = 1) in the full sample and is
12.0% higher in the female sample. The effects are quantitatively not small,
compared with the unconditional probabilities of being obese, measured by
the corresponding obesity prevalence rates (24.3% and 19.5% for the full and
female samples, respectively). The sign effect, however, is not significant.
As in the BMI regressions, non-monotonic correlations with age, per
capita household income (INCOME), and working hours per week (WORK-
HOUR) are significant for the full and female samples in both models. For
example, the probability of being obese in the full sample is the lowest at JPY
3.389 million of INCOME for model (1) and at JPY 3.526 million for model
(2); these values are reasonably close to the corresponding critical values of
income in the BMI regressions.
Insert Table 11:
Binary probit regressions of obesity
The probability of being severely obese has a significant negative cor-
relation with the sign effect in the full and female samples, implying that
respondents who do not display the sign effect are likely to be severely obese.
For example, in model (1), the probability of respondents who do not display
the sign effect being severely obese is 2.7% higher than the corresponding
probability for those who do display the sign effect in the full sample, and
is 4.2% higher than the corresponding probability for those who display the
sign effect in the female sample. The increases in the probability due to the
absence of the sign effect are as large as, or even larger than the uncondi-
tional probabilities of being severely obese (3.1% and 1.4% for the full and
female samples, respectively).
Although the effects of hyperbolic discounting in model (1) are insignifi-
cant, the effects of homework procrastination PROCR in model (2) are sig-
nificantly positive for the full and male samples. In particular, compared
with the males’ unconditional probability of being severely obese (3.6%), the
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marginal effect of PROCR (1.1%) on the probability of being severely obese
is considerable.
Insert Table 12:
Binary probit regressions of severe obesity
4.3 Underweight
Table 13 reports the results on underweight. In the full and female samples,
consistent with our hypothesis, models (1) and (2) show that the probability
of being underweight has a significantly positive correlation with the sign
effect. For both models, respondents displaying the sign effect belong to
the underweight group with a 4% higher probability in the full sample, and
with a 5% higher probability in the female sample, than those who did not
display the effect. Again, the effects are large, compared to the corresponding
unconditional probabilities of being underweight (i.e., 8.7% and 9.5% in the
full and female samples, respectively). In model (2), procrastination has a
significant negative effect on the probability of being underweight in the full
and female samples.
Aging has quadratic effects on the underweight probability for the full
and male samples. In the full sample, the probability of being underweight
reaches its lowest level at around 52.5 years (model (1)) or 55.5 years (model
(2)). The probability of females being underweight has a significant non-
monotonic correlation with per capita household income INCOME with pos-
itive coefficients on INCOME squared, where the probability is the lowest
at an income of JPY 3.455 million for model (1) and JPY 3.422 million for
model (2).24
Insert Table 13:
Binary probit regressions of underweight
Finally, by using the above results in the full sample for model (2), Table
14 summarizes the impacts of differences in the time discounting variables
on the probabilities of being obese, severely obese, and underweight, wherein
“∆impatience,” “∆procrastination,” and “∆sign effect” are the same as in
24The fact that the females’ BMI and obesity also show quadratic curves in INCOME
suggests that the sample SDs of BMI stratified by income classes will form a U-shaped
curve. Actually, the female sample SDs of BMI for the first to fifth income quintile groups
are 3.584, 3.331, 2.761, 3.221, and 3.248, respectively, which form a U-shape, as expected.
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Table 10. All the impacts have expected signs, and many of them are sig-
nificant. Compared with the corresponding unconditional probabilities, the
magnitudes of the impacts of these time discounting variables are not negli-
gible.25
Insert Table 14:
Impacts of time discounting variables on Probs of being obese, severely
obese, and underweight: The case of Model (2) in the full sample
5 Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical fact that debtors are more likely to be obese than
non-debtors, we hypothesized that, as in the case of debt holdings, interper-
sonal differences in body mass are related to interpersonal differences in time
discounting as well as to differences in other demographic and economic fac-
tors. It has been partially (especially in the female sample) confirmed that
time discounting affects body mass through impatience, hyperbolic discount-
ing or procrastination, and the sign effect. Caloric intake behavior and the
resulting body mass formation can thus be thought as determined as an in-
tertemporal decision-making. An important policy implication is that the
obesity rate can be affected by changing the intertemporal structure of the
costs and benefits of obesity, especially that of medical costs.
Body mass has also been found to have a non-monotonic correlation with
age, per capita household income, and working hours. In particular, the
quadratic curve estimated between per capita household income and BMI
implies that an increase in income inequality leads to an increase in the
social average of BMI, whereas an increase in the average income lowers the
average BMI.
Our regression models, however, do not have high explanatory power. The
adjusted R-squared of the BMI regression is, at most, 11.8%, and the mod-
els can explain only around 23% of the observed cross-sectional covariation
between BMI and debt holding, measured by the sample covariance between
BMI and DEBT. One possible reason for this is that genetic factors have
dominant effects on BMI (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 2005). Another short-
coming may be that we failed to take into account interpersonal or regional
25These results remain unchanged even when the probabilities of being obese, severely
obese, and underweight are jointly estimated by estimating multivariate probit models
with correlated error terms. For the results of the multivariate probit regression, see the
Appendix.
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differences in food prices.26
Future research would need to extend the analysis to a panel analysis so
as to explain recent BMI dynamics in Japan. As reported by Borghans and
Golsteyn (2006), it may be difficult to explain time series changes in BMI
by changes in consumer preferences including time preference. Changes in
economic factors such as income, working hours, food prices, and medical
costs could be considered as more important.
26However, even when the effects of the regional and occupational differences are con-
trolled for by adding the prefecture and occupation dummies to the set of the explanatory
variables, the main results do not change substantially. For the estimation results with
the prefecture and occupation dummies, see the Appendix.
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APPENDIX
To check the robustness of our main results that are obtained in the text,
this Appendix reports the regression results in the following alternative cases:
A Incorporating prefecture and occupation dummies,
B Jointly estimating the probabilities of being obese, severely obese, and
underweight by estimating multivariate probit models that allow cor-
relations among error terms, and
C Using the uncorrected body mass data.
A Incorporating prefecture and occupation
dummies
Our respondents’ body mass could depend on regional and/or occupational
factors. For example, the relative prices of various foods, and hence those of
a calorie differ among regions. In the text, we have not controlled for any
regional or occupational factors. The JHS contains the data of the respon-
dents’ residential prefectures (numbered 1 (Hokkaido) to 48 (Okinawa)) and
occupations (numbered 1 (office workers) to 13 (others)). By constructing
47 of prefecture dummies and 12 of occupational dummies to add to the set
of the explanatory variables, the same models as in Tables 9 (BMI) and 11
(OBESITY) to 13 (UNDERWEIGHT) are estimated. The results are re-
ported in Table A1 through A4, where the coefficients of the prefecture and
occupation dummies are omitted.
Insert Table A1:
BMI regression with prefecture and occupation dummies
Insert Table A2:
Obesity probit regression with prefecture and occupation dummies
Insert Table A3:
Severe obesity probit regression with prefecture and occupation dummies
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Insert Table A4:
Underweight probit regression with prefecture and occupation dummies
Although the significance levels of the estimated coefficients of some vari-
ables become weaker (e.g., the coefficients of DEBTIMP and PROCR of the
BMI regression in Table A1), the results, as a whole, do not change consid-
erably from those in the text. In many cases, the values of the R squared or
those of the log-likelihood improve.
One problem in these regressions is that, especially in the case of se-
vere obesity and underweight, compared with the number of severely obese
or underweight respondents, too many explanatory dummy variables are in-
corporated,27 so that we cannot help excluding redundant dummy variables
from the data. Consequently, the number of the samples are unnecessarily
reduced in these regressions (e.g., In Table A3, only 1192 samples are used in
Model (1) and only 1131 in Model (2), whereas in Table 12, 1658 and 1629
samples are used in Models (1) and (2), respectively). To avoid this problem,
the prefecture and occupation dummies have not been controlled for in the
analysis in text.
B Estimating multivariate probit models
By construction, the binary indicators OBESITY and SEVERE OBESITY
necessarily have a negative correlation; and UNDERWEIGHT necessarily
has negative correlations with OBESITY and SEVERE OBESITY. These
correlations may well be retained after controlling for the effects of the ex-
planatory variables in the regressions variables, so that the error terms of
the probit regressions regarding OBESITY, SEVERE OBESITY, and UN-
DERWEIGHT, conducted independently in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, may well be
correlated with each other. Based on the assumption that the error terms are
correlated with each other, the probabilities of being obese, severely obese,
and underweight can be jointly estimated by conducting multivariate probit
regression. The results are reported in Table A6. It can be seen that the
results regarding the signs and the significance levels of the estimated coeffi-
cients do not differ largely from those in Tables 11-13. Note that significant
correlations among the error terms remain.
27For example, among 1658 samples in Table 12 that are used to estimate Model (1) in
the SEVERE OBESITY regression, the number of the severely obese respondents is less
than 50, whereas the number of the prefecture and occupation dummies amounts to 58.
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Insert Table A5:
Multivariate probit estimation of the prob. of being obesity, severely obese,
and underweight
C Using the uncorrected body mass data
We finally report the estimation results when the uncorrected data of BMI,
OBESITY, and SEVERE OBESITY, instead of the corrected data, are used
to estimate the same models as estimated in Tables 9, 11, and 12 (note that
the data of UNDERWEIGHT are not revised from the original data).
Insert Table A6:
OLS regressions of uncorrected BMI
Insert Table A7:
Binary probit regressions of obesity by the uncorrected data
Insert Table A8:
Binary probit regressions of severe obesity by the uncorrected data
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Table 1: Debt holdings and body mass 
Severe
Obesity
Debtors 23.262 0.287 0.045 0.060
Nondebtors 22.714 0.227 0.027 0.074
(t-values) (3.671) *** (3.153) *** (2.348) ** (-1.240)
Severe
Obesity
Debtors 23.898 0.345 0.044 0.027
Nondebtors 23.506 0.278 0.035 0.043
(t-values) (1.880) * (2.322) ** (0.814) (-1.341)
Severe
Obesity
Debtors 22.635 0.230 0.047 0.093
Nondebtors 22.005 0.182 0.021 0.102
(t-values) (3.084) *** (1.962) ** (2.587) *** (-0.481)
Notes: The data are those from the Japan Household Survey on Consumer
Preferences and Satisfaction 2005, corrected for the self-reporting biases. 
For the correction method, see Section 3.1.  
The t-values represent those for mean differences in body mass statuses 
between debtors and nondebtors.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
BMI Obesity Underweight 
Female
Obesity Underweight 
All
BMI Obesity Underweight
Male
BMI
 
 
 
Table 2: Definitions of obesity and underweight
          BMI WHO criteria JSSO criteria
          BMI <18.5 Unnderweight Underweight
18.5?BMI<25 Normal range Normal range
          BMI=22 Standard (ideal) Standard (ideal) 
   25?BMI<30 Preobese Obese (degree1)
   30?BMI<35 Obese (class I) Obese (degree2)
   35?BMI<40 Obese (class ?) Obese (degree3)
   40?BMI Obese (class ?) Obese (degree3)
Obese
Severe-Obese
This paper
Underweight
Normal range
Standard (ideal) 
 
 
Note: The JSSO criteria are based on “New Criteria,” 2002, Japan Society for the Study 
of Obesity.  
 
Table 3(a): By-age BMI distributions: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data. 
　
Age NSHN04 NSHN04
Means 22.52 22.46 (0.448) 22.66 (0.623) 20.28 20.23 (0.428) 20.29 (0.572)
S.D. 3.62 3.98 (0.107) 4.09 (0.054) * 2.54 2.55 (0.474) 2.64 (0.281)  
Means 23.42 23.25 (0.284) 23.38 (0.451) 20.95 20.84 (0.302) 20.85 (0.699)
S.D. 3.36 3.61 (0.111) 3.69 (0.060) * 2.99 2.62 (0.008) *** 2.62 (0.008) ***
Means 24.07 23.63 (0.045) * 23.85 (0.202) 22.64 22.03 (0.004) *** 22.19 (0.996) *
S.D. 3.37 3.30 (0.353) 3.40 (0.432) 3.57 2.98 (0.000) *** 3.12 (0.004) ***
Means 23.69 23.57 (0.262) 23.76 (0.640) 22.97 22.36 (0.001) *** 22.71 (0.999)
S.D. 2.89 2.92 (0.399) 3.02 (0.169) 3.21 2.80 (0.001) *** 3.21 (0.492)
Means 23.75 23.24 (0.002) *** 23.61 (0.237) 23.35 22.87 (0.010) ** 23.29 (0.990)
S.D. 3.00 2.60 (0.001) *** 2.99 (0.478) 3.47 3.01 (0.001) *** 3.57 (0.273)
Means 23.65 23.35 (0.003) *** 23.59 (0.298) 22.37 21.94 (0.000) *** 22.17 (1.000) *
S.D. 3.15 3.14 (0.457) 3.31 (0.022) ** 3.25 2.96 (0.000) *** 3.29 (0.291)  
Obs. 2286 2789
Notes: Values in parentheses represent P-values for the null hypotheses that coresponding statistics equal those of 
the NSHN04 data. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Male Female
JHS05 Corrected dataJHS05 Corrected data
20s
30s
1499149913681368
40s
50s
60-71
all
Table 3(b): By-age obesity distributions: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data. 
NSHN04 NSHN04
20s 0.199 0.133 (0.025) ** 0.195 (0.876) 0.054 0.035 (0.261) 0.049 (0.915)
30s 0.289 0.252 (0.167) 0.292 (0.922) 0.083 0.079 (0.745) 0.086 (0.782)
40s 0.327 0.267 (0.012) ** 0.324 (0.885) 0.179 0.139 (0.016) ** 0.179 (0.976)
50s 0.308 0.248 (0.003) *** 0.305 (0.918) 0.241 0.161 (0.000) *** 0.240 (0.955)
60-71 0.299 0.237 (0.002) *** 0.298 (0.984) 0.298 0.218 (0.000) *** 0.297 (0.964)
all 0.297 0.240 (0.000) *** 0.296 (0.893) 0.195 0.143 (0.000) *** 0.195 (0.956)
Obs. 2286 2789
Notes: Values in parentheses represent P-values for the null hypotheses that coresponding statistics equal those of  
the NSHN04 data. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 3(c): By-age severe obesity distributions: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data. 
NSHN04 NSHN04
20s 0.021 0.035 (0.290) 0.035 (0.290) 0.008 0.007 (0.655)  0.007 (0.655)
30s 0.030 0.050 (0.052) * 0.050 (0.052) ** 0.012 0.008 (0.523)  0.008 (0.523)
40s 0.034 0.036 (0.960) 0.036 (0.960) 0.027 0.015 (0.106) 0.024 (0.848)
50s 0.032 0.034 (0.779) 0.034 (0.780) 0.036 0.015 (0.001) *** 0.032 (0.541)
60-71 0.031 0.008 (0.000) *** 0.031 (0.956) 0.045 0.025 (0.013) ** 0.048 (0.724)
all 0.031 0.029 (0.586) 0.036 (0.159) 0.029 0.015 (0.000) *** 0.027 (0.516)
Obs. 2286 2789
Notes: Values in parentheses represent P-values for the null hypotheses that coresponding statistics equal those of  
the NSHN04 data. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 3(d): By-age underweight distributions: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data. 
NSHN04 NSHN04
20s 0.084 0.115 (0.114) 0.214 0.211 (0.913)
30s 0.038 0.074 (0.000) *** 0.156 0.143 (0.431)
40s 0.021 0.032 (0.112) 0.066 0.103 (0.000)***
50s 0.020 0.016 (0.523) 0.054 0.057 (0.680)
60-71 0.036 0.036 (0.994) 0.066 0.050 (0.105)
all 0.033 0.042 (0.010) ** 0.093 0.095 (0.625)
Obs. 2286 2789
Notes: Values in parentheses represent P-values for the null hypotheses that coresponding statistics equal those of  
the NSHN04 data. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
JHS05 Corrected data
1368
1499149913681368
14991499
Male
1368 1499
Male Female
JHS05 (Corrected) JHS05 (Corrected)
Male
Female
Female
1368
JHS05 Corrected data
JHS05 Corrected dataJHS05 Corrected data
 
 
 
Table 4: Question to elicit discount rates: An example (QUESTION 1 for DR1)  
 
QUESTION 1.  
Suppose you have two options to receive some money. You may choose Option “A”, to receive 
10,000 JPY in two days; or Option “B”, to receive a different amount in nine days. Compare the 
amounts and timing in Option “A” with Option “B” and indicate which amount you would 
prefer to receive for each of all 8 choices.  
 
 
Note: The Japan Household Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction, 2005. 
Option A (JPY) 
(Receipt in 2 days) 
Option B (JPY) 
(Receipt in 9 days)
Interest rate 
(Annual) 
Circle A or B. 
10,000 9,981 -10% A B 
10,000 10,000 0% A B 
10,000 10,019 10% A B 
10,000 10,038 20% A B 
10,000 10,096 50% A B 
10,000 10,191 100% A B 
10,000 10,383 200% A B 
10,000 10,574 300% A B 
Table 5: Elicited discount rates under alternative choice conditions
DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5
Timings ((A)
or (B))
2 days or
9 days
90 days or
97 days
1 month or
13 months
1 month or
13 months
1 month or
13 months
Amounts for
(A)
10,000JPN 10,000JPN 10,000JPN 1millionJPY1millionJPY
Receipt or
payment receipt receipt receipt receipt payment
 Mean 1.904 1.892 0.153 0.023 -0.008
 Median 0.741 0.741 0.080 0.008 0.001
 S.D. 2.390 2.421 0.193 0.042 0.044
 Obs. 2737 2768 2790 2771 2331
Note: The Japan Household Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction, 2005.
sign effect:
DR4>DR5 (0.00)
Choice
conditions
Descriptive
statistics
Time discounting anomalies
(P-value)
hyperbolic discounting:
DR1>DR2 (0.426)
Table 6: Definitions of variables and basic statistics 
Variables Definition Mean S.D. Obs.
BMI Body mass index data that are corrected for the self-reporting bias by using the manners 
explained in Section 3.1 
22.846 3.371 2869 
OBESITY A binary indicator for obesity which equals 1 if BMI ≧ 25 and 0 otherwise 0.243 0.429 2869 
SEVERE OBESITY A binary indicator for severe obesity which equals 1 if BMI ≧ 30 and 0 otherwise 0.031 0.174 2869 
UNDERWEIGHT A binary indicator for underweight which equals 1 if BMI < 18.5 and 0 otherwise 0.070 0.255 2869 
DRSTD Simple mean, defined by equation (1), of the standardized values of the elicited discount 
rates DRi (i = 1,…,5) as a measure of the degree of impatience 
0.042 0.688 2202 
DEBTIMP A proxy of the degree of impatience, measured by standardized residuals of debt holding 
DEBT after regressing it on explanatory variables other than the degree of impatience 
(see the first regression in Table 5) 
0.000 1.000 1704 
HYPERBOL A binary indicator for hyperbolic discounting which equals 1 if DR1 > DR2, and 0 
otherwise. 
0.621 0.485 2694 
PROCR Response to the question ‘When did you do homework assignments in the summer 
vacation in your high school days?’ on a 5-point scale, from 1 (homework was finished at 
‘the beginning of the vacation’) to 5 (it was not done until ‘the very end of the vacation’), 
which is a proxy measure of the degree of procrastination. 
3.282 1.300 2910 
SIGN A binary indicator for the sign effect which equals 1 if DR4 > DR5, and 0 otherwise 0.885 0.319 2289 
RISKAV A variable which measures the degree of risk aversion, constructed by subtracting from 
100 the respondents' responses to the question: "When you go out, how high probability 
of rainfall makes you bring an umbrella with you?" 
0.505 0.205 2941 
MALE A binary indicator for males which equals 1 for male respondents and 0 otherwise 0.470 0.499 2987 
UNIV A binary indicator for university graduates which equals 1 for university graduates and 0 
otherwise 
0.204 0.403 2893 
AGE Ages of respondents 49.080 12.968 2983 
DEBT A binary indicator for debt holding other than housing loan which equals 1 for debt 
holders and 0 otherwise. 
0.251 0.434 2806 
INCOME Per capita household income in million yen 2.213 1.583 2361 
ΔINCOME The expected percentage change of income in a forthcoming year, estimated from 
responses to the question: ‘What is the expected rate of change in your whole household 
income this year?’   
-0.948 3.914 2707 
WORKHOUR Work hours for a week 27.191 22.922 2879 
SMOKING A ordered variable indicating the strength of smoking habits on a 6-point scale, from 1 
(smoking no cigarette a day) to 6 (smoking more than two packages of cigarettes a day) 
2.125 1.713 2972 
 
Table 7: Time discounting and debt holdings 
Dependent
variable: DEBT
DRSTD 0.085 (5.434) ***
PROCR 0.015 (1.819) * 0.013 (1.617)
SIGN -0.057 (-1.724) * -0.066 (-1.892) *
RISKAV -0.174 (-3.342) *** -0.174 (-3.228) ***
UNIV -0.054 (-2.141) ** -0.062 (-2.429) **
AGE 0.021 (3.315) *** 0.021 (3.227) ***
AGE^2 0.000 (-4.000) *** 0.000 (-3.935) ***
INCOME -0.036 (-2.168) ** -0.043 (-2.441) **
INCOME^2  0.004 (2.337) ** 0.006 (2.708) ***
ΔINCOME -0.006 (-2.099) ** -0.007 (-2.440) **
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: The probabiltiy of debt holding is estimated by using binary probit models.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 8: Correlations between impatience proxy (DEBTIMP) and elicited 
discount rates.
DRSTD DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5
DEBTIMP 0.137 0.091 0.071 0.115 0.110 0.080
(t -values) (5.583)*** (3.711)*** (2.919)*** (4.762)*** (4.555)*** (3.325)***
Notes: Impatience proxy DEBTIMP is construcetd from standardized residuals of the 
binary probit estimation of the probability of debt holding (see the first result in Table 7). 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
1704 1640
Marginal Effects (t -value) Marginal Effects (t -value)
-928.902 -875.692
Table 9: OLS regressions of BMI
DRSTD 0.300 (2.067) ** 0.277 (1.345) 0.303 (1.485)
DEBTIMP 0.257 (3.301) *** 0.167 (1.489) 0.332 (3.086) ***
HYPERBOL 0.128 (0.642) 0.192 (0.662) 0.047 (0.1709)
PROCR 0.225 (3.647) *** 0.182 (1.993) ** 0.250 (3.028) ***
Sign effect SIGN -0.578 (-2.351) ** -0.322 (-0.873) -0.752 (-2.288) ** -0.516 (-2.112) ** -0.177 (-0.495) -0.776 (-2.337) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.671 (-1.713) * -1.001 (-1.821) * -0.482 (-0.859) -0.860 (-2.197) ** -1.026 (-1.884) * -0.799 (-1.424)
MALE 1.315 (6.768) *** 1.219 (6.182) ***
UNIV -0.128 (-0.656) -0.278 (-1.110) 0.073 (0.229) -0.148 (-0.747) -0.274 (-1.092) -0.026 (-0.081)
AGE 0.242 (5.162) *** 0.213 (3.061) *** 0.256 (3.871) *** 0.240 (5.093) *** 0.208 (3.001) *** 0.263 (3.947) ***
AGE^2 -0.002 (-4.237) *** -0.002 (-2.740) *** -0.002 (-2.859) *** -0.002 (-4.099) *** -0.002 (-2.658) *** -0.002 (-2.868) ***
INCOME -0.273 (-2.277) ** -0.134 (-0.852) -0.598 (-2.754) *** -0.303 (-2.436) ** -0.114 (-0.702) -0.712 (-3.269) ***
INCOME^2 0.040 (2.994) *** 0.027 (1.665) * 0.079 (2.745) *** 0.041 (2.896) *** 0.023 (1.332) 0.091 (3.143) ***
WORKHOUR 0.033 (2.253) ** 0.008 (0.370) 0.042 (1.804) * 0.029 (1.945) * -0.006 (-0.313) 0.053 (2.207) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.221 (-2.081) ** -0.017 (-0.102) -0.301 (-1.937) * -0.198 (-1.841) * 0.084 (0.509) -0.373 (-2.343) **
Others SMOKING -0.061 (-1.247) -0.052 (-0.870) -0.101 (-1.113) -0.074 (-1.497) -0.046 (-0.778) -0.154 (-1.666) *
Constant 17.026 (15.852) *** 19.172 (12.544) *** 16.736 (10.919) *** 16.507 (15.063) *** 18.544 (11.932) *** 16.221 (10.448) ***
Adj. R^2
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Binary probit regressions of obesity
DRSTD 0.058 (2.961) *** 0.045 (1.507) 0.065 (2.588) ***
DEBTIMP 0.028 (2.639) *** 0.031 (1.967) ** 0.022 (1.655) *
HYPERBOL 0.040 (1.494) 0.060 (1.448) 0.020 (0.585)
PROCR 0.027 (3.166) *** 0.020 (1.525) 0.030 (2.820) ***
Sign effect SIGN -0.007 (-0.193) 0.006 (0.116) -0.005 (-0.132) -0.003 (-0.089) 0.014 (0.270) -0.008 (-0.178)
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.063 (-1.184) -0.169 (-2.152) ** 0.032 (0.461) -0.076 (-1.438) -0.157 (-2.029) ** -0.001 (-0.008)
MALE 0.101 (3.789) *** 0.087 (3.214) ***
UNIV -0.056 (-2.141) ** -0.058 (-1.615) -0.062 (-1.531) -0.056 (-2.094) ** -0.054 (-1.503) -0.076 (-1.824) *
AGE 0.022 (3.231) *** 0.017 (1.610) 0.029 (3.007) *** 0.023 (3.290) *** 0.017 (1.624) 0.032 (3.252) ***
AGE^2 0.000 (-2.787) *** 0.000 (-1.421) 0.000 (-2.603) *** 0.000 (-2.787) *** 0.000 (-1.404) 0.000 (-2.812) ***
INCOME -0.037 (-2.212) ** -0.008 (-0.366) -0.103 (-3.800) *** -0.041 (-2.433) ** -0.006 (-0.254) -0.118 (-4.24) ***
INCOME^2 0.006 (2.881) *** 0.003 (1.1210) 0.014 (3.817) *** 0.041 (3.092) *** 0.003 (1.055) 0.016 (4.181) ***
WORKHOUR 0.004 (2.247) ** 0.001 (0.420) 0.007 (2.310) ** 0.004 (1.907) * -0.001 (-0.295) 0.008 (2.529) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.030 (-2.068) ** -0.003 (-0.110) -0.047 (-2.392) ** -0.026 (-1.791) * 0.013 (0.567) -0.054 (-2.640) ***
Others SMOKING -0.004 (-0.585) -0.003 (-0.383) -0.007 (-0.597) -0.004 (-0.583) -0.002 (-0.236) -0.011 (-0.932)
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 12: Binary probit regressions of severe obesity
DRSTD -0.003 (-0.377) -0.003 (-0.304) -0.003 (-0.400)
DEBTIMP 0.006 (1.726) * 0.004 (0.797) 0.005 (1.696) *
HYPERBOL -0.003 (-0.298) -0.012 (-0.764) 0.007 (0.656)
PROCR 0.007 (2.310) ** 0.011 (2.051) ** 0.002 (0.933)
Sign effect SIGN -0.027 (-2.008) ** -0.005 (-0.261) -0.042 (-2.585) *** -0.024 (-1.954) * -0.001 (-0.050) -0.034 (-2.552) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.027 (-1.452) -0.040 (-1.391) -0.013 (-0.610) -0.035 (-2.091) ** -0.039 (-1.438) -0.023 (-1.477)
MALE 0.016 (1.665) * 0.013 (1.504)
UNIV -0.006 (-0.687) -0.013 (-0.998) 0.002 (0.138) -0.008 (-0.927) -0.010 (-0.767) -0.006 (-0.589)
AGE 0.001 (0.596) 0.001 (0.339) 0.003 (1.162) 0.001 (0.252) 0.000 (-0.053) 0.002 (0.721)
AGE^2 0.000 (-0.542) 0.000 (-0.378) 0.000 (-1.064) 0.000 (-0.085) 0.000 (0.103) 0.000 (-0.568)
INCOME -0.005 (-0.945) 0.001 (0.166) -0.013 (-1.716) * -0.008 (-1.610) -0.002 (-0.313) -0.014 (-2.256) **
INCOME^2 0.001 (1.1919) 0.000 (0.292) 0.001 (1.438) 0.001 (1.799) * 0.001 (0.722) 0.001 (1.881) *
WORKHOUR 0.000 (0.438) -0.001 (-0.704) 0.001 (1.682) * 0.000 (-0.165) -0.001 (-1.152) 0.001 (1.427)
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.002 (-0.448) 0.005 (0.606) -0.010 (-1.557) 0.001 (0.172) 0.009 (1.061) -0.006 (-1.264)
Others SMOKING -0.003 (-1.262) -0.004 (-1.362) -0.002 (-0.537) -0.004 (-1.606) -0.003 (-1.101) -0.006 (-1.436)
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 13: Binary probit regressions of underweight
DRSTD 0.009 (0.863) 0.004 (0.389) 0.011 (0.643)
DEBTIMP -0.008 (-1.425) -0.005 (-0.929) -0.009 (-0.988)
HYPERBOL 0.010 (0.702) -0.006 (-0.392) 0.030 (1.314)
PROCR -0.009 (-2.197) ** -0.005 (-1.419) -0.013 (-1.856) *
Sign effect SIGN 0.040 (2.461) ** 0.023 (1.189) 0.053 (2.116) ** 0.040 (2.538) ** 0.018 (1.471) 0.055 (2.144) **
Risk aversion RISKAV 0.041 (1.422) -0.040 (-0.132) 0.116 (2.434) ** 0.034 (1.202) -0.004 (-0.164) 0.104 (2.159) **
MALE -0.034 (-2.394) ** -0.028 (-2.015) **
UNIV -0.013 (-0.918) 0.002 (0.1664) -0.033 (-1.439) -0.011 (-0.782) 0.002 (0.208) -0.031 (-1.270)
AGE -0.012 (-3.863) *** -0.009 (-2.804) *** -0.008 (-1.481) -0.012 (-4.025) *** -0.007 (-3.001) *** -0.009 (-1.713) *
AGE^2 0.000 (3.077) *** 0.000 (2.384) ** 0.000 (0.697) 0.000 (3.245) *** 0.000 (2.542) ** 0.000 (0.972)
INCOME -0.004 (-0.492) 0.011 (0.766) -0.030 (-1.772) * -0.006 (-0.655) 0.024 (1.397) -0.030 (-1.689) *
INCOME^2 0.000 (0.290) -0.002 (-1.066) 0.004 (2.064) ** 0.000 (0.376) -0.006 (-1.560) 0.004 (1.999) **
WORKHOUR -0.002 (-1.768) * -0.002 (-1.353) 0.000 (0.250) -0.002 (-1.739) * -0.001 (-1.139) 0.000 (-0.071)
WORKHOUR^(1/2) 0.014 (1.801) * 0.008 (0.869) 0.004 (0.354) 0.014 (1.776) * 0.004 (0.644) 0.008 (0.616)
Others SMOKING 0.02 (0.604) 0.020 (0.466) 0.002 (0.309) 0.002 (0.412) 0.001 (0.560) 0.000 (0.035)
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Male Female
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value)
-373.459
Marginal effects(t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable: OBESITY (1) (2)
All Male Female All
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-875.777 -863.595 -481.210 -366.513
1658 818 840 1629 812 817
-488.201
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects(t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable: SEVERE OBESITY (1) (2)
All Male Female All Male Female
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-200.818 -196.881 -116.399-79.642 -74.069
1658 818 840 1629 812 817
-115.743
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects(t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable:  UNDERWEIGHT (1) (2)
All Male Female All Male Female
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-382.243 -369.856 -133.419-228.668 -223.863
1658 818 840 1629 812 817
-140.439
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Table A1: OLS regression of BMI with prefecture and occupation dummies
DRSTD 0.369 (2.49) ** 0.332 (1.54) 0.252 (1.20)
DEBTIMP 0.253 (3.17) *** 0.181 (1.55) 0.266 (2.36) **
HYPERBOL 0.136 (0.66) 0.100 (0.33) -0.017 (-0.06) 
PROCR 0.214 (3.32 ) *** 0.193 (1.96) ** 0.215 ( 2.46) **
Sign effect SIGN -0.511 (-2.03) ** -0.210 (-0.54) -0.731 (-2.17) ** -0.521 (-2.01) ** -0.179 (-0.45) -0.756 (-2.19) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.684 (-1.68) * -0.960 (-1.64) -0.799 (-1.36) -0.756 (-1.80) * -0.993 (-1.65) * -1.015 (-1.66) *
MALE 1.337 ( 5.99) *** 1.259 (5.44) ***
UNIV -0.187 (-0.90) -0.530 (-1.91) * 0.266 (0.80) -0.263 (-1.23) -0.630 (-2.21) ** 0.211 (0.61)
AGE 0.253 (5.04) *** 0.233 (3.09) *** 0.296 (4.07) *** 0.256 (4.94) *** 0.231 ( 3.01) *** 0.286 (3.85) ***
AGE^2 -0.002 (-4.15) *** -0.002 (-2.80) *** -0.002 (-3.19) *** -0.002 (-4.03) *** -0.002 (-2.73 ) *** -0.002 (-2.91) ***
INCOME -0.298 (-2.37) ** -0.158 (-0.95) -0.586 (-2.59) *** -0.294 (-2.12) ** -0.126 (-0.68) -0.622 (-2.66) ***
INCOME^2 0.042 (3.03)  *** 0.027 (1.60) 0.079 (2.67) *** 0.040 (2.51) ** 0.021 (1.06) 0.081 (2.69) ***
WORKHOUR 0.034 (1.80) * 0.009 (0.34) 0.066 (2.08) ** 0.035 (1.77) * -0.001 (-0.04) 0.077 (2.33) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.260 (-1.43) -0.013 (-0.05) -0.602 (-2.24) ** -0.265 (-1.40) 0.067 (0.23) -0.671 (-2.40) **
Others SMOKING -0.062 (-1.22) -0.052 (-0.84) -0.135 (-1.43) -0.073 (-1.40) -0.038 (-0.59) -0.207 (-2.09) **
Constant 18.063 (11.89) *** 18.890 (7.48) *** 18.486 (9.17) *** 17.718 (11.16)*** 18.450 (7.14) *** 18.352 (8.97) ***
Adj. R^2
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The prefecture dummies (47) and the occupation dummies (12) are added to the set of explanatory variables.
The estimated coefficients of those dummies are not reported in the table. 
Male Female All Male Female
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable: BMI (1) (2)
All
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
0.095 0.010 0.116 0.099 0.012 0.141
1643 813 830 1551 772 779
Table A2: Binary probit regression of obesity with prefecture and occupation dummies
DRSTD 0.071 (3.55 ) *** 0.053 (1.70) * 0.066 (2.45) **
DEBTIMP 0.027 (2.52) ** 0.033 (1.99) ** 0.018 (1.28)
HYPERBOL 0.045 (1.61) 0.042 (0.95) 0.015 (0.42)  
PROCR 0.024 (2.70) *** 0.023 (1.60) 0.026  (2.27) **
Sign effect SIGN 0.005 (0.13) 0.013 (0.24) -0.011 (-0.25) 0.008 (0.22) 0.017 (0.30) -0.012 (-0.26)
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.070 (-1.27) -0.198 (-2.33) ** -0.004 (-0.05) -0.082 (-1.46) -0.210 (-2.43) ** -0.044 (-0.55) 
MALE 0.111 (3.65) *** 0.099 (3.17) ***
UNIV -0.069 (-2.50) ** -0.097 (-2.43) ** -0.040 (-0.90) -0.075 (-2.67) *** -0.109 (-2.69) *** -0.044 (-0.94) 
AGE 0.024 (3.33) *** 0.021 (1.84)  * 0.033 (3.05) *** 0.025  (3.28) *** 0.020 (1.74) 0.034 ( 2.98) ***
AGE^2 0.000 (-2.84) *** 0.000 (-1.56) 0.000 (-2.69 )*** 0.000 (-2.78) *** 0.000 (-1.51) 0.000 (-2.57) ***
INCOME -0.041 (-2.32) ** -0.014 (0.56) -0.109 (-3.59) *** -0.039 (-2.17) ** -0.006 (-0.23) -0.120 (-3.75) ***
INCOME^2 0.006 (3.00) *** 0.003 (1.12) 0.015 (3.74) *** 0.006 (2.83) *** 0.002 (0.74) 0.017 (3.88) ***
WORKHOUR 0.004 (1.74) * 0.001 (0.32) 0.008 (2.08) ** 0.004 (1.52) -0.002 (-0.53) 0.010 (2.36 ) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.027 (-1.11) 0.005 (0.11) -0.067 (-1.96) ** -0.025 (-0.97) 0.038 (0.82) -0.080 (-2.26) **
Others SMOKING -0.004 (-0.64) -0.003 (-0.38) -0.009 (-0.69) -0.004 (-0.62) -0.001 (-0.10) -0.018 (-1.32)
Log likelihood -789.634
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The prefecture dummies (47) and the occupation dummies (12) are added to the set of explanatory variables.
The estimated coefficients of those dummies are not reported in the table. 
Table A3: Binary probit regression of severe obesity with prefecture and occupation dummies
DRSTD -0.001 (-0.16) -0.002 (-0.09) -0.005 (-0.48) 
DEBTIMP 0.007 (1.93) * 0.008 (0.87) 0.005 (2.18) **
HYPERBOL -0.002 (-0.20) -0.021 (-0.81) 0.010 (0.71) 
PROCR 0.009 (2.58) *** 0.019 (2.18) ** 0.002 (1.34)
Sign effect SIGN -0.025 (-1.60) 0.004 (0.15)  -0.041 (-1.76) -0.026 (-1.81) * 0.007 (0.25)  -0.027 (-1.79) *
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.027 (-1.21) -0.056 (-1.15) -0.023  (-0.77) -0.023 (-1.20) -0.045 (-0.98) -0.013 (-0.95) 
MALE 0.016 (1.31) 0.012 ( 1.12) 
UNIV -0.005 (-0.43) -0.012 (-0.55) 0.014 (0.72) -0.006 (-0.66) -0.008 (0.701) -0.002 (-0.36)
AGE 0.003 (1.00) 0.007 (1.07) 0.004 (1.00) 0.002 (0.90) 0.005 (0.83) 0.000 (0.13)
AGE^2 0.000 (-1.02) 0.000 (-1.10) 0.000 (-0.95) 0.000 (-0.82) 0.000 (-0.80) 0.000 (0.01)
INCOME -0.006 (-1.00) 0.001 (0.09) -0.017 (-1.59) -0.006 (-1.15) 0.000 (-0.01) -0.011 (-2.30) **
INCOME^2 0.001 (1.47) 0.001 (0.60) 0.002 (1.46) 0.001 (1.56) 0.001 (0.59) 0.001 (2.07) **
WORKHOUR 0.000 (0.46) -0.002 (-0.54) 0.002 (1.69) * 0.001 (0.67) -0.002 (-0.63) 0.001 (1.96) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.006 (-0.67) 0.011 (0.34) -0.020 (-1.82) * -0.008 (-0.90) 0.014 (0.41) -0.010 (-1.98) **
Others SMOKING -0.004 (-1.65) * -0.009 (-1.76) * -0.002 (-0.54) -0.005 (-2.18) ** -0.009 (-1.72) * -0.006 (-1.67) *
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The prefecture dummies (47) and the occupation dummies (12) are added to the set of explanatory variables.
The estimated coefficients of those dummies are not reported in the table. 
Table A4: Binary probit regression of severe obesity with prefecture and occupation dummies
DRSTD 0.003 (0.29) -0.002 (-0.78) 0.016 (0.85)
DEBTIMP -0.011 (-1.90) * -0.001 (-1.62) -0.012 (-1.12)
HYPERBOL 0.007 (0.50) -0.002 (-0.50)  0.032 (1.34)
PROCR -0.009 (-2.15) ** -0.001 (-1.52) -0.013 (-1.69) *
Sign effect SIGN 0.035 (2.33) ** 0.004 (1.38) 0.049 (1.91) * 0.036 (2.39) ** 0.002 (1.76) * 0.049 (1.77) *
Risk aversion RISKAV 0.040 (1.47) -0.001 (-0.13) 0.133 (2.60) *** 0.036 (1.27) -0.001 (-0.26) 0.137 ( 2.47) **
MALE -0.043 (-2.89) *** -0.038 (-2.63) **
UNIV -0.010 (-0.80) 0.006 (1.65) * -0.047 (-2.15) ** -0.011 (-0.77) 0.003 (1.81) * -0.052 (-2.11) **
AGE -0.010 (-3.22) *** -0.002 (-3.10) *** -0.006 (-0.96) -0.011 (-3.34) *** -0.001 (-3.36) *** -0.006 (-0.92)
AGE^2 0.000 (2.52) ** 0.000 (2.82) *** 0.000 (0.35)  0.000 (2.61) *** 0.000 (3.03) *** 0.000 ( 0.31)
INCOME -0.002 (-0.25) 0.005 (1.66) * -0.032 (-1.72) * -0.004 (-0.42) 0.004 (2.11) ** -0.038 (-1.90) *
INCOME^2 0.000 (0.22)  -0.001 (-1.67) * 0.004 (1.99)  ** 0.000 (0.30) -0.001 (-1.97) ** 0.005 (2.20) **
WORKHOUR -0.002 (-1.64) * 0.000 (-0.77) -0.001 (-0.44) -0.002 (-1.57) 0.000 (-0.41) -0.002 (-0.51) 
WORKHOUR^(1/2) 0.020 (1.63) 0.001 (0.34) 0.027 (1.08) 0.020 (1.55) 0.000 (-0.11) 0.028 (1.04) 
Others SMOKING 0.002 (0.68) 0.000 (-0.34) 0.008 (1.15) 0.002  (0.59) 0.000 (-0.10) 0.007 (0.90)
Log likehood
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The prefecture dummies (47) and the occupation dummies (12) are added to the set of explanatory variables.
The estimated coefficients of those dummies are not reported in the table. 
Male Female All Male Female
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable: OBESITY (1) (2)
All
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-835.748 -455.651 -336.367 -423.651 -315.694
1643 806 796 1551 765 747
Male Female All Male Female
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable: SEVERE OBESITY (1) (2)
All
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-171.938 -91.510 -54.227 -159.048 -88.224 -41.317
1192 444 391 1131 425 321
Male Female All Male Female
Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value) Marginal effects (t-value)
Impatience
Dependent variable:  UNDERWEIGHT (1) (2)
All
Hyperbolic discounting
Demographic factors
Economic factors
-346.028 -99.237 -195.070 -323.657 -90.692 -181.899
1528 554 681 1407 531 624
Table A5: Multivariate probit estimation of the prob. of obesity, severe obesity, and underweight
Dependent variables:
DRSTD 0.197 (3.03) *** -0.016 (-0.14) 0.068 (0.75)
DEBTIMP 0.089 (2.62) *** 0.116 (1.94) * -0.084 (-1.60)
HYPERBOL 0.129 (1.43) 0.000 (0.00) 0.065 (0.50)
PROCR 0.090 (3.20) *** 0.123 (2.29) ** -0.092 (-2.43) **
Sign effect SIGN -0.032 (-0.29) -0.356 (-2.12) ** 0.442 (2.33) ** -0.020 (-0.18) -0.264 (-1.50) 0.481 (2.50) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.559 ( -1.87) * 0.318 (1.26) -0.256 (-1.48) -0.679 (-2.24) ** 0.325 (1.27)
MALE 0.335 (3.82) *** 0.202 (1.30) -0.252 (-2.03) ** 0.276 (3.11) *** (1.48) -0.251  (-2.00)**
UNIV -0.190 ( -2.11) -0.113 ( -0.70) -0.094 (-0.74) -0.189 (-2.08) ** -0.078 (-0.47) -0.126 (-0.97)
AGE 0.070 ( 3.14 ) ** 0.035 ( 0.89) -0.104 (-3.83) *** 0.075  (3.33) *** 0.017 (0.42) -0.109 (-3.98) ***
AGE^2 -0.001 (-2.70) *** 0.000 (-0.79) 0.001 (3.04)  *** -0.001 (-2.82) *** 0.000 (-0.21) 0.001 (3.21) ***
INCOME -0.108 (-2.01) ** -0.079 (-0.93) -0.046 (-0.60) -0.123 (-2.26) ** -0.144 (-1.65) * -0.050 (-0.62)
INCOME^2 0.016 ( 2.71) *** 0.011 (1.30 ) 0.002 (0.26) 0.018 (2.97) *** 0.017 (1.99) ** 0.003  (0.28)
WORKHOUR 0.014 (2.16) ** 0.005 (0.40) -0.019 (-1.94) ** 0.013 (1.95) * 0.002  (0.17) -0.017 (-1.69) 
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.095 (-2.00 ) ** -0.039 (-0.45) 0.134  (1.94) ** -0.088 (-1.84) * -0.015 (-0.18) 0.125 (1.76)  
Others SMOKING -0.012 (-0.56 ) -0.035 (-0.88) 0.021 (0.66) -0.011 (-0.51) -0.058 (-1.42) 0.011 (0.34)
Constant -2.459 ( -4.74 ) *** -2.110 (-2.31) ** 0.733 (1.20) -2.769 (-5.18 *** -2.197 ( -2.34) ** 1.160 (1.84) *
1 0.759 (15.61) *** -0.422 (-6.04) *** 1 0.748 (14.63) *** -0.406 (-6.10) ***
1 -0.252 (-8.66) *** 1 -0.320 (-3.64) ***
1 1
#obs
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The estimation is conducted by using the "mvprobit" program in the software STATA. 
Obesity
-1361.592
1658 1629
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value)
Correlation matrix of error terms
-1386.588Log likelihood
OBESITY, SEVERE OBESITY,
UNDERWEIGHT
Underweight Obesity Severe Obesity Underweight
Coef. (t-value)
χ2(3) = 144.499  Prob >  χ2 = 0.000 χ2(3) = 137.479  Prob > χ2 = 0.000
H0: all error term correlations = 0, H0: all error term correlations = 0,
Coef. (t-value)
Loglikelihood ratio test:
Model (1) Model (2)
Impatience
Hyperbolic
discounting
Demographic
factors
Economic
factors
Coef. (t-value)Coef. (t-value)
Severe Obesity
Table A6: OLS regression of uncorrected BMI 
DRSTD 0.273 (2.025) ** 0.276 (1.421) 0.256 (1.363)
DEBTIMP 0.246 (3.400) *** 0.167 (1.574) 0.314 (3.199) ***
HYPERBOL 0.105 (0.565) 0.177 (0.647) 0.014 (0.056)
PROCR 0.217 (3.796) *** 0.179 (2.08) ** 0.240 (3.178) ***
Sign effect SIGN -0.550 (-2.400) ** -0.300 (-0.863) -0.723 (-2.400)** -0.490 (-2.159) ** -0.165 (-0.491) -0.743 (-2.447) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.659 (-1.805) * -0.972 (-1.872) * -0.465 (-0.902) -0.815 (-2.243) ** -0.992 (-1.933) * -0.725 (-1.412)
MALE 1.301 (7.191) *** 1.212 (6.622) ***
UNIV -0.118 (-0.648) -0.256 (-1.081) 0.059 (0.203) -0.137 (-0.748) -0.247 (-1.047) -0.046 (-0.155)
AGE 0.238 (5.470) *** 0.230 (3.508) *** 0.235 (3.865) *** 0.238 (5.438) *** 0.226 (3.468) *** 0.242 (3.971) ***
AGE^2 -0.002 (-4.643) *** -0.002 (-3.244) *** -0.002 (-2.922)*** -0.002 (-4.542) *** -0.002 (-3.180) *** -0.002 (-2.965) ***
INCOME -0.257 (-2.297) ** -0.130 (-0.876) -0.518 (-2.599)*** -0.271 (-2.352) ** -0.105 (-0.682) -0.604 (-3.031) ***
INCOME^2 0.038 (3.000) *** 0.026 (1.727) * 0.067 (2.533) ** 0.037 (2.804) *** 0.021 (1.336) 0.076 (2.861) ***
WORKHOUR 0.030 (2.215) ** 0.008 (0.426) 0.037 (1.734) * 0.027 (1.950) * 0.004 (-0.213) 0.048 (2.197) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.202 (-2.044) ** -0.032 (-0.207) -0.264 (-1.847)* -0.184 (-1.849) * 0.056 (0.357) -0.337 (-2.310) **
Others SMOKING -0.055 (-1.197) -0.046 (-0.817) -0.097 (-1.161) -0.068 (-1.476) -0.041 (-0.738) -0.149 (-1.759) *
Constant 17.019 (17.013) *** 18.705 (12.965) *** 17.103 (12.145)*** 16.458 (16.180) *** 18.063 (12.337) *** 16.537 (11.651) ***
Adj. R^2
#obs
Notes: The uncorrected BMI data from JHS05 are used. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table A7: Binary probit regression of obesity by the uncorrected data 
DRSTD 0.037 (2.093) ** 0.036 (1.338) 0.032 (1.512)
DEBTIMP 0.023 (2.470) ** 0.021 (1.420) 0.023 (2.032) **
HYPERBOL 0.013 (0.543) 0.027 (0.687) 0.001 (0.037)
PROCR 0.028 (3.616) *** 0.029 (2.333) ** 0.024 (2.613) ***
Sign effect SIGN -0.046 (-1.488) -0.018 (-0.357) -0.063 (-1.668)* -0.037 (-1.205) 0.004 (0.079) -0.065 (-1.684) *
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.022 (-0.465) -0.092 (-1.272) 0.045 (0.742) -0.031 (-0.663) -0.070 (-0.992) 0.009 (0.1424)
MALE 0.087 (3.675) *** 0.069 (2.864) ***
UNIV -0.030 (-1.286) -0.037 (-1.120) -0.020 (-0.574) -0.028 (-1.170) -0.031 (-0.930)  -0.033 (-0.896)
AGE 0.019 (3.053) *** 0.018 (1.872) * 0.020 (2.488) ** 0.020 (3.148) *** 0.019 (1.935) * 0.021 (2.592) ***
AGE^2 0.000 (-2.749) *** 0.000 (-1.716) * 0.000 (-2.229)** 0.000 (-2.785) *** 0.000 (-1.774) * 0.000 (-2.261) **
INCOME -0.035 (-2.493) ** -0.021 (-1.021) -0.071 (-3.224)*** -0.040 (-2.752) *** -0.020 (-0.943) -0.081 (-3.634) ***
INCOME^2 0.004 (2.727) *** 0.003 (1.367) 0.009 (3.116) *** 0.005 (2.912) *** 0.003 (1.276) 0.009 (3.415) ***
WORKHOUR 0.004 (2.412) ** 0.002 (0.874) 0.006 (2.352) ** 0.003 (1.926) * 0.000 (-0.046) 0.007 (2.577) **
WORKHOUR^(1/2) -0.027 (-2.061) ** -0.011 (-0.492) -0.039 (-2.249)** -0.022 (-1.669) * 0.008 (0.356) -0.045 (-2.528) **
Others SMOKING -0.005 (-0.884) -0.004 (-0.536) -0.011 (-1.056) -0.005 (-0.798) -0.002 (-0.206) -0.016 (-1.475)
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: The uncorrected data from JHS05 are used. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table A8: Binary probit regression of severe obesity by the uncorrected data  
DRSTD -0.003 (-0.561) -0.005 (-0.638) 0.000 (-0.125)
DEBTIMP 0.002 (0.753) 0.002 (0.620) 0.001 (0.379)
HYPERBOL -0.004 (-0.616) -0.006 (-0.522) 0.000 (0.039)
PROCR 0.007 (3.180) *** 0.011 (2.447) ** 0.003 (1.713) *
Sign effect SIGN -0.017 (-1.753) * 0.000 (0.018) -0.025 (-2.446)** 0.011 (-1.665) * 0.000 (0.004) -0.020 (-2.305) **
Risk aversion RISKAV -0.034 (-2.591) *** -0.049 (-2.140) ** -0.016 (-1.513) -0.031 (-2.878) *** -0.037 (-1.960) ** -0.019 (-2.078) **
MALE 0.015 (2.120) ** 0.008 (1.398)
UNIV -0.004 (-0.647) -0.007 (-0.696) 0.000 (-0.008) -0.002 (-0.448) -0.004 (-0.498) -0.001 (-0.114)
AGE 0.002 (1.283) 0.005 (1.519) 0.001 (0.498) 0.002 (1.274) 0.004 (1.372) 0.001 (0.455)
AGE^2 0.000 (-1.427) 0.000 (-1.685) * 0.000 (-0.476) 0.000 (-1.331) 0.000 (-1.494) 0.000 (-0.369)
INCOME -0.003 (-0.919) 0.001 (0.197) -0.004 (-0.676) -0.005 (-1.676) -0.003 (-0.552) -0.081 (-1.269)
INCOME^2 0.000 (1.257) 0.000 (0.385) 0.000 (0.100) 0.001 (2.051) ** 0.001 (1.165) -0.005 (0.477)
WORKHOUR 0.000 (0.062) 0.000 (0.1338) 0.000 (0.291) 0.000 (-0.020) 0.000 (0.059) 0.000 (0.053)
WORKHOUR^(1/2) 0.000 (0.0638) -0.002 (-0.278) 0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.087) -0.001 (-0.173) 0.000 (0.169)
Others SMOKING -0.002 (-1.378) -0.003 (-1.010) -0.004 (-1.111) -0.002 (-1.451) -0.002 (-1.074) -0.003 (-1.087)
Log likelihood
#obs
Notes: The uncorrected data from JHS05 are used. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: BMI distribution: NSHN04, JHS05, corrected data 
Figure 1(a): Male
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Figure 1(b): Female
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Note: NSHN04, JHS05, and corrected data represent the National Survey of Health and Nutrition 
2004, the Japan Household Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction 2005, and the 
corrected data of JHS05, respectively.  
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Figure 2(a) Income and BMI: Female (model (1))
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Figure 2(b)  Income and BMI: Female (Model (2))
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Figure 3: Females' Income Elasticities of BMI 
in Income Quintiles
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Figure 4: Females' Working Hour Elasticities of BMI
Model (1)
Model (2)
Working hour elasticity = 0 at: 
- working hours = 12.84 for model (1)
- working hours = 12.38 for model (2)
